“Lebanon is not a nation but a group of statelets” is a saying that has, for ages, been repeated by Lebanese men and women throughout the country. It is a byproduct of the Lebanese political system, which has always given priority to sectarian affiliations at the expense of an inclusive national identity. Since before the establishment of the state of Greater Lebanon, sects were the main component of power within feudal alliances that control land and monopolize methods of production. This coalition of feudalism and sects held the reins of power with the cooperation and support of both regional and international powers, thus this implicit governance equation remained intact well after its components agreed on an insincere social contract in accordance with the 1926 constitution. This sectarian arrangement continued despite several amendments to the mock social contract, from the post-independence National Pact of 1943, to the Taif accord in 1990, leading up to the Doha agreement in 2008, which established consensual democracy between sects as the basic principle of governance in the country. None of the amendments succeeded in developing an actual social contract, because no matter who the players are or what constitutions are in place, the rules of the game have never changed. 

Throughout the years, our social contract has evolved and was modified; the aim, however, was never to establish a new actuality that pulls the country out of the cycle of conflicts between sects, in order to rebuild relations between the ruler and the ruled on the basis of citizenship and equality before the law. Rather, amendments merely reflected the evolutions of the balance of power between sects, where the victor increased its privileges at the expense of the defeated following cycles of conflicts and civil wars. Our system was and stays resistant to change and progress, regardless of whether the basic charters differed or if amendments were made to the social contract. That is because the constitution and the constitutional institutions emanating from it were never centers of governance and decision-making, but simply tools for implementing the decisions of sects and their leaders. From the constitution established in 1926, to the Taif accord, to the Doha agreement, our social contract has been nothing but pictorial. Perhaps the greatest example in our modern history of the utter failure of the constitution and its institutions is what is known as the “dialogue table”. Leaders of the parties representing the major sects have gathered around it so that their deliberations and decisions become the supreme and only law for the country, one that transcends the constitution and voids the constitutional institutions of any actual value in decision-making or actual governance.

Any country, especially one as small as Lebanon, must cultivate friendships with its surroundings and the world to stimulate its economy, and to enable and engage its diplomatic network of relations, provided that these friendships remain based on the foundations of respect for mutual sovereignty. As for Lebanon, it is clear that its decisions have never been sovereign, but rather closely linked to its relations with other countries, whether before independence, during the era of colonialism or the French mandate, or during the phases of tutelage and direct and indirect occupation after it. If we look at the history of Lebanon up to this day, we find that throughout the various stages of its political history, Lebanon has continuously remained mortgaged to other countries, whether Arab or Western. And every political party, past or present, has unequivocally offered its loyalty to “parent” or “sponsor” foreign countries, whether they be an Arab state, Regional power or a Western government in Europe, America or Russia. Lebanese politicians have always allowed these countries to encroach upon Lebanon and make it a fertile arena for their disputes, involving its people in conflicts and wars that do not concern them. The dependency only kept growing, until it got to a stage where Lebanese politicians could not agree to any political and economic solutions without their regional and international sponsors weighing in. Numerous conferences have taken place in Lausanne, Taif and Doha up to the French initiative by President Macron in 2020, as well as several rounds of indebting in Paris 1, 2 and 3 up to the Cedre Conference. To truly understand the depth of this unending pledge, and the extent of its entrenchment in the mentality of the Lebanese ruler, we can go back to 1861 when a protocol was signed to end a war between the Christians and the Druze. This protocol placed France as the sponsor for the Maronite community, Russia for the Orthodox, Austria for the Catholics, and England for the Druze, keeping the Sunni and Shiite sects under the authority of the Ottomans (Turkey). This system that divided the country into sectarian reserves remains in place to this day.

This all demonstrates that the politicians who are supposed to be entrusted with the nation do not attach any importance to the interest of Lebanon and its people. Rather, they act upon their personal interests to accumulate wealth and empower their party base, by giving priority to the interests of the countries that they have pledged loyalty to, making Lebanon and the Lebanese people a bargaining chip up for sale at a global auction.

Establishing a prosperous economy is one of the priorities of governance, as it is the main focus of electoral programs and the main reason for the success or failure of governments. A thriving economy is based on investment in productive sectors and in the country's ability, regardless of its size and resources, to produce and export, create jobs and stimulate sustainable growth. In stark contrast, Lebanon’s economic scene is in shambles. On one hand, the economy is not on the rulers’ list of priorities, and on the other hand it is based on a rentier model that stimulates the import of capital. The economy is fed through borrowing and financial engineering, exporting labor, and relying on remittances from expatriates, as well as on revenues from the tourism and services sectors. The banking sector even became a partner of the political sectarian ruling class by financing its economic policies, which led to the collapse of the economy and the evaporation of depositors' money. The ruling political class neglected to invest public money in productive sectors, such as industry and agriculture. It also failed to protect Lebanese products at the local level, or to create global markets for export through international agreements. Rather, they wasted all public funds through clientelism, a model saturated with theft and corruption. Moreover, the political class’s priorities center on corruption, partisan and sectarian conflicts over state spoils, the shareholding of private enterprises and companies, and the practice of legalized monopoly. These are all major reasons that further disallowed the existence of an infrastructure network, necessary to stimulate and develop the productive sectors and to attract beneficial and targeted foreign investment.

The state in the Lebanese system is nothing but a spoil, to be shared by sect leaders in war and in peace. The power of sectarian parties is based on networks of interests, services, and benefits, the main source of which is the state, as well as administrations and public interests. The sectorial political entities and leaderships attracted support and maintained their popular representation by subjugating the state and its administrations, and granting public (and private) jobs to their supporters, thus striking the principle of competence in accessing public office, and replacing it with the only standard of loyalty to the leader and the sect. The absence of competence and the supremacy of criminals made the state - with its institutions, administrations and interests - a den for the employment of failures, corrupt individuals, and ex militia fighters. The public administration became a symbol of corruption, a depiction of failure in managing citizen affairs, and a cemetery for competent employees. After several decades, these sects and their parties established such a deeply rooted dominion over the state that ministries and administrations have become private reserves for one leader or another. This means that for all Lebanese citizens, any interactions they need to have with the state and its administrations are directly and automatically handled by the relevant leader and their party. This reality strengthened clientelism and the political culture of "services", and made access to any public service a privilege granted by a leader, as opposed to a right protected and guaranteed by law. The goal of controlling the articulations of the state is not limited to securing jobs and establishing popular bases. Rather, the primary goal is to seize the state’s wealth and resources through systematic corruption, which varies from major projects approved by the Council of Ministers to tenders in the smallest government departments, and everything in between. Here, the importance of sectarian quotas is highlighted, as the distribution of spoils in the state, especially in major affairs and projects that require several approvals or signatures (such as decrees, for example) make it necessary for the pillars of government to agree among themselves on the number of shares allotted to each party. What many might not know is that most of the clashes - some of which have developed into conflicts - between sectarian parties are not primarily political or ideological, but rather failures to agree on each party’s share in the process of dividing the wealth garnered from the public treasury, that is, the money of the Lebanese people.

In any democratic system, justice is considered one of the most important principles that must be achieved for a successful exercise of governance. And justice requires that the law prevails above all, whether in relations between individuals, or in those between the ruler and the ruled. In Lebanon, however, justice is relative and selective, granted and withheld according to the interests of those who control it. There are three dimensions to the actuality that is the absence of justice and the principle of impunity in Lebanon, which are the marginalization and subjugation of the judiciary, the existence of legal and constitutional immunities, and that of de facto immunities.

The first dimension is the marginalization of the judiciary - just as was done with the constitution. The sham courts lack one of the most important conditions for their effectiveness, which is their independence from all other authorities. The judiciary in Lebanon is completely subject to the executive authority, particularly through the process of appointing judges to their positions and courts. The absence of the rule of law along with the subjugation of the judiciary constitute an existential need for the continuity of the current Lebanese sectarian system for several reasons. First, the sectarian quota system guarantees that the work of institutions is not subject to any form of legal oversight. Any effective oversight would expose the actions of these institutions and shut them down, and would condemn their officials to punishment, thus stopping the wheel of corruption and the illegal decisions that spring from it. Secondly, the system of services upon which sectarian leaderships are based has extended to include "judicial services" that the sect leader provides to his party members and political base. The continuity of these services is paralleled by the continued submission of the judiciary to the authority of sectarian quotas. The second dimension is legal and constitutional immunities, as the Lebanese political system relies on a series of constitutional articles, laws and legislation. These include the laws of immunities, banking secrecy, and others, all of which grant statutory immunities that extend to anyone from the President of the Republic to government employees and officials. This places them above accountability and liability thus facilitating their unlawful actions, which secures the continuation and expansion of the networks of interests, services and benefits upon which their authority is based. Finally, the third dimension is the de facto immunities that benefit those within the leaders’ inner circles, i.e. their families and friends, as well as benefitting partisans, large financiers, business partners and other leaders in the party. What distinguishes this group in particular is that they profit from de facto immunity, with the blessing of the leader, despite the absence of any actual legal immunity. In addition, this group might have direct authority over the judicial appointments, and sometimes monopolize control of those appointments and consequently control of all services of a judicial nature, which allows them to accumulate power and wealth and reinforces their de facto immunity.
 

“Knowledge is power” is a saying that everyone knows, but those who understand it with excellence are the Lebanese sectarian and ideological parties. The ruling sectarian parties established schools, universities, institutes and scout movements, or claimed authority over existing educational institutions by imposing special curricula, appointing the educational staff or controlling teacher and professor unions and Student bodies. Moreover, these parties, in collusion with the successive governments and parliaments, have intentionally sabotaged the development of schools, universities, and public institutes to the point of depriving these public educational institutions of donations and aid, while private educational institutions flourish and multiply, especially those affiliated with the beforementioned parties and sects. Naturally, schools and universities became the ideal environment for the upbringing of future generations on the concepts of parties, sects and robust ideologies, rather than being the incubating environment for the education and consolidation of concepts of citizenship and national identity. From this standpoint, we also understand the parties ’unwillingness to develop curricula for national and civic education, or even to agree to write a unified history for Lebanon. It is also worth noting the state of corruption and quotas in the licenses granted to many schools, universities and private institutes that are not granted on the basis of competence, curriculum and need, but rather on the basis of benefit and trade, leading to the random sprouting of such institutions with all the scandals that come along. In conclusion, this educational strategy has always been a systematic act by the ruling sectarian class over the eras to consolidate its authority based on sectarian and ideological affiliation and the absence of national identity.

One of the pillars of social justice is the equal access of citizens to the opportunities and services provided by the state, without any discrimination.
In Lebanon, the reality is that “balanced development” remains a promise, which is only repeated by politicians and government officials without any actual or tangible results. To approach this issue, it must first be emphasized that development is directly related to the human factor; that is, it is related to human life and the level of services provided by the state to them, including healthcare, housing, education, job opportunities, and others. As for balanced development, it is closely related to geography, so that all citizens receive equal services, and that the necessities of life are equally available to every citizen irrespective of geography. 
In Lebanon, however, through a basic comparison of the level and quality of these services between the main cities and the various other Lebanese regions - especially rural areas and those located on the outskirts - we can confidently conclude that development is limited to the central capital Beirut and a few other cities and regions, specifically those that constitute centers of strength and weigh in on the equations of the sects and their parties. Development in Lebanon and the right to access opportunities and services is, in reality, unrelated to citizenship, but rather intrinsically linked to the interests of sects and their leaders, and to the importance that a region holds for the leader of this or that sect. "Balanced development" remains a promotional slogan, revived by the leaders in electoral campaigns and remains solely material for electoral consumption, to spread false hope in the hearts of citizens living in deprived regions.
 

The weakness and absence of the state and its inability to protect Lebanese citizens, especially after the outbreak of the civil war, has led to the emergence of many armed groups, who took it upon themselves to deter external aggressions, but also to protect and expand their areas of influence at home. In light of this reality, the concepts of national defense and the preservation of national security, which the state is supposed to monopolize with its armed forces, have been replaced with the concepts of popular resistance and self-security, based on certain ideological or sectarian criteria. This, in turn, has led to linking Lebanon's security and defense capabilities to a specific sect or political party, and renders the country vulnerable to targeting after any political clash between sects, parties, or their regional and international sponsors. 
Many militias have become self-ruling security forces in their areas of influence, consequently committing countless violations against the residents of these regions, from imposing taxes on shops and stores to illegal arrests, kidnappings and physical intimidation and/or harming of citizens. 
Hezbollah tops the list of armed forces that exist outside the framework of the state and its institutions today, due to the increase in its power and the expansion of its military capabilities. However, the actual problem goes beyond this party and its areas of influence. The culture of self-governance, as well as the existence of areas that remain outside of the state’s control, is spreading in the Lebanese territory, starting from some streets, alleys and neighborhoods in the capital and its suburbs, to the Palestinian camps and certain mountainous areas, reaching to the Bekaa, the north, the south and the borders. This haphazard and unregulated distribution of weapons and culture of semi-autonomous sectarian statelets that persevered even after the end of the civil war, is a reality which sectarian authorities are keen to reinforce by resorting to a policy of spreading fear of the “other”, be it an internal or external party, in order to preserve their power at the expense of the state.